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Original Research Article
When digital health meets digital
capitalism, how many common
goods are at stake?
Tamar Sharon
Abstract
In recent years, all major consumer technology corporations have moved into the domain of health research. This
‘Googlization of health research’ (‘GHR’) begs the question of how the common good will be served in this research. As
critical data scholars contend, such phenomena must be situated within the political economy of digital capitalism in
order to foreground the question of public interest and the common good. Here, trends like GHR are framed within a
double, incommensurable logic, where private gain and economic value are pitted against public good and societal value.
While helpful for highlighting the exploitative potential of digital capitalism, this framing is limiting, insofar as it acknow-
ledges only one conception of the common good. This article uses the analytical framework of modes of justification
developed by Boltanksi and The´venot to identify a plurality of orders of worth and conceptualizations of the common
good at work in GHR. Not just the ‘civic’ (doing good for society) and ‘market’ (enhancing wealth creation) orders, but
also an ‘industrial’ (increasing efficiency), a ‘project’ (innovation and experimentation), and what I call a ‘vitalist’ (pro-
liferating life) order. Using promotional material of GHR initiatives and preliminary interviews with participants in GHR
projects, I ask what moral orientations guide different actors in GHR. Engaging seriously with these different conceptions
of the common good is paramount. First, in order to critically evaluate them and explicate what is at stake in the move
towards GHR, and ultimately, in order to develop viable governance solutions that ensure strong ‘civic’ components.
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‘It feels good to do good’
(Verily, 2018)
The ‘Googlization of health research’
and the common good
In the last few years, every major consumer technology
corporation, from Google to Apple, to Facebook,
Amazon, Microsoft and IBM, has moved decisively
into the health and biomedical sector. These are compa-
nies that, for the most part, have had little interest in
health in the past, but that by virtue of their data expert-
ise and the large amounts of data they already have
access to, are becoming important facilitators, if not ini-
tiators, of data-driven health research and healthcare.
This ‘Googlization of health research’ (GHR), as I
have called this process elsewhere (Sharon, 2016),
promises to advance health research by providing the
technological means for collecting, managing and
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analysing the vast and heterogeneous types of data
required for data-intensive personalized and precision
medicine. Apple’s ResearchKit software, for example,
which turns the iPhone into a platform for conducting
medical studies, allows researchers to access diverse
types of data (sleeping patterns, food consumption,
gait), to recruit larger numbers of participants than
average in clinical trials, and to monitor participants
in real time (Savage, 2015). Similarly, the new analytics
techniques and data repositories oﬀered by consumer
technology companies seek to overcome limitations in
traditional medical analytics methods and infrastruc-
ture. DeepMind, for example, Google’s London-based
artiﬁcial intelligence oﬀshoot, is applying deep learning
for the prediction of cardiovascular risk, eye disease,
breast cancer and patient outcomes, in collaboration
with several hospitals (Poplin et al., 2018; Ram,
2018). Verily, Alphabet’s life science branch, is develop-
ing new tools to capture and organize unstructured
health data, for example in its ‘Project Baseline’ in part-
nership with Stanford and Duke University. The study
will collect and analyse a wide range of genetic, clinical
and lifestyle data on 10,000 healthy volunteers, with the
aim of comprehensively ‘mapping human health’
(Verily, 2018). Google, Microsoft, Amazon and IBM
have also begun packaging their clouds as centralized
genomic databases where researchers can store and run
queries on genomic data.
Many of these techniques still have not delivered on
their promises, all the while introducing a host of new
challenges and limitations, such as new selection and
other types of biases (Agniel et al., 2018; Hemkens
et al., 2016; Jardine et al., 2015). Yet their potential, if
not over-hyped, remains promising (Fogel et al., 2018),
and places these corporations in a privileged position in
the move towards personalized medicine and Big Data
analytics – and broader healthcare vistas. Indeed, most
recently a number of these companies have begun
moving into the domains of electronic health record
management, employee healthcare and health insurance
(Farr, 2017; Farr, 2018; Wingﬁeld et al., 2018).
Beyond these promises, GHR also raises a number of
challenges and risks. First amongst these are concerns of
privacy and informed consent. GHR is an instance of
data-intensive research characterized by the use of large
digital datasets and Big Data analytics, where trad-
itional mechanisms put in place to protect research par-
ticipants are increasingly under strain. These issues may
be exacerbated in situations where consumer technology
companies, whose data-sharing practices often are not
subject to the same privacy-protecting regulations and
codes of conduct as those of medical researchers, are
involved (Zang et al., 2015). The potential for ‘context
transgressions’ (Nissenbaum, 2010), whereby data may
ﬂow between medical, social and commercial contexts
governed by diﬀerent privacy norms, is greater here.
Furthermore, broader questions about the value of per-
sonal health data and publicly generated datasets, and
what market advantage is conferred to commercial enti-
ties who can access them and develop treatments and
services based on this access, will emerge. In other
words, in GHR initiatives, concerns that are common
in the practices of digital capitalism are imported into
the health realm (Sharon, 2016).
A recent controversy surrounding a data sharing
partnership between Google DeepMind and the NHS
illustrates how some of these issues are already playing
out. Announced in 2016, the collaboration between
DeepMind and the Royal Free London, a NHS
Foundation Trust, granted DeepMind access to identi-
ﬁable information on 1.6 million of its patients in order
to develop an app to help medical professionals identify
patients at risk of acute kidney injury (AKI). The terms
of this agreement have been analysed in depth by
Powles and Hodson (2017, 2018), who argue that it
lacked transparency and suﬀered from an inadequate
legal and ethical basis. Indeed, following an investiga-
tion, the Information Commissioner’s Oﬃce (ICO,
2017) ruled that this transfer of data and its use for
testing the app breached data protection law. Namely,
patients were not at all aware that their data was being
used. Under UK common law, patient data can be used
without consent if it is for the treatment of the patient,
a principle known as ‘direct care’, which the Trust
invoked in its defence. But as critics argue, insofar as
only a small minority of the patients whose data was
transferred to DeepMind had ever been tested or trea-
ted for AKI, appealing to direct care could not justify
the breadth of the data transfer.1
Of course, GHR collaborations taking place in dif-
ferent jurisdictions will be provided with diﬀerent
opportunities and face diﬀerent legal challenges. And
despite the global proﬁle of the corporations in ques-
tion, national and regional guidelines for the manage-
ment of AI and Big Data in health will impact what
GHR collaborations can and cannot do. But the
DeepMind case also raises questions beyond data pro-
tection, privacy and informed consent, which have to
do with the newfound role that tech corporations will
play in health research and healthcare, and new power
asymmetries between corporations, public health insti-
tutions and citizens that may ensue. For example, will
these corporations become the gatekeepers of valuable
health datasets? What new biases may be introduced
into research using technologies, such as iPhones, that
only certain socio-economic segments of the population
use? What role will these companies, already dominant
in other important domains of our lives, begin to play
in setting healthcare agendas? These are questions that
concern collective and societal beneﬁt – broadly
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speaking, the common good. They point to the need to
situate the analysis of GHR in the wider context of the
political economy of data sharing and use, and they
foreground a number of concerns that move beyond
(just) privacy and informed consent, including social
justice, accountability, democratic control and the
public interest.
These values are the focus of the growing body of
literature in critical data studies that draws on a polit-
ical economy critique to address the development of
new power asymmetries and discriminations emerging
in Big Data infrastructures (Taylor, 2017; van Dijk,
2014; Zuboﬀ, 2015). In this context, new Big Data div-
ides can be expected based on access to and ownership
of data, technological infrastructures and technical
expertise, with important repercussions for who
shapes the future of (health) research (boyd and
Crawford, 2012). However, by focusing on the new
power asymmetries emerging between data subjects
and corporations, critical data studies tend to frame
data sharing in terms of two incommensurable logics:
public beneﬁt and private, corporate gain. In this art-
icle, I argue that this dichotomy is limiting, insofar as it
only allows for one vision of the common good, while a
plurality of conceptualizations of the common good are
at work in GHR. In the following, I use the interpretive
framework of economies of worth developed by the
sociologists Luc Boltanski and Laurent The´venot
(2006 [1991]) to identify a number of moral repertoires
that each draw upon diﬀerent conceptualizations of the
common good and that are mobilized by actors in
GHR-type initiatives. Doing so depicts a much richer
ethical terrain of GHR than is accounted for in most
critical analyses of digital capitalism.
This is valuable for several reasons. First, it is para-
mount that the moral orientations of actors in GHR be
taken seriously, insofar as they inﬂuence and guide
decision-making processes that are currently taking
place. Here I draw on the constructivist tradition that
views the discourses, repertoires and logics that convey
moral orientations as performative; as contributing to
the enactment of technological futures (Foucault, 1965;
Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Critical research on GHR
must engage with these competing moral orientations
and conceptualizations of the common good. Second,
this type of mapping is a necessary ﬁrst step towards
critically evaluating diﬀerent moral repertoires, insofar
as it contributes to rendering explicit the trade-oﬀs that
will be involved in the enactment of diﬀerent reper-
toires. In the current situation, where no comprehensive
ethical and policy guidance for GHR exists, this is
required if we are to have serious public deliberation
about what is at stake in the move towards GHR.
Finally, while Boltanski and The´venot’s framework
was developed as a descriptive project, I argue that it
can be used to help develop normative guidelines for
governance of GHR-type projects, and that this should
be further developed into a research programme. Here,
solutions can be thought of as combinations of reper-
toires, where diﬀerent repertoires can check and bal-
ance each other. Such solutions will have a good
chance of adoption insofar as they will appeal to a
wide range of actors. Further, if what Boltanski and
The´venot call the ‘civic’ order of worth embodies the
most publicly legitimate conception of the common
good, we can design solutions that ensure the presence
of strong civic components. For this, however, the civic
repertoire must be ‘updated’, so to speak: it must ﬁrst
engage seriously with competing conceptions of the
common good that are mobilized in the empirical real-
ity of GHR. The article thus seeks to map and analyse
the diﬀerent orders of worth invoked by actors involved
in GHR as a ﬁrst step towards this endeavour.
A plurality of common goods
Digital clinical labour
In recent years, critical studies of digital capitalism have
been very useful for analysing who stands to beneﬁt and
how from data ﬂows; for articulating the question of the
common good. Here, a dichotomy of public beneﬁt vs.
private gain provides a framework for understanding
data generation and data sharing practices in numerous
domains across our increasingly dataﬁed and digital
society. The notion of ‘digital labour’ (Fuchs, 2013;
Terranova, 2000) has been paramount in this approach.
A number of scholars have adopted this framing in
the health context, highlighting a profoundly problem-
atic merging of digital labour with ‘clinical labour’
(Cooper and Waldby, 2014) – more problematic than
mere digital labour insofar as participation in health-
related research is associated with a sense of public
good in ways that participation in other online activities
are not. Here, the mobilization of the language of the
public good, altruism and solidarity by corporations is
seen as a particularly pernicious and eﬀective rhetorical
strategy for exploitation and value extraction. Thus, for
example, Deborah Lupton (2014) contends that the
sharing of patient experiences online, motivated by per-
sonal and altruistic reasons, has been commodiﬁed and
exploited for ﬁnancial proﬁt. Similarly, in their illumi-
nating analysis of the intermingling logics of gift and
commercial exchange underpinning participatory prac-
tices in 23andMe research, Harris et al. argue that,
altruistic notions of participation and gift exchange are
used by the company to draw attention away from
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what we have suggested is a form of free labour – con-
tributing information on the internet through complet-
ing surveys – and clinical labour – submitting the saliva
sample for analysis. (2013: 250)
And in their study on user reactions to 23andMe’s ﬁrst
patent obtained using its customers’ data, Sterckx et al.
(2013) also highlight the uncomfortable dissonance
between users’ altruistic motivations for donating
their data for research and the company’s commercial
motivations as indicated by patent-seeking.
These studies help cultivate an acute critical sensi-
tivity to the risks raised by the presence of powerful
consumer technology actors in health research. They
help situate a phenomenon like GHR in the broader
political economy of digital capitalism, where public
values including accessibility and openness, transpar-
ency, democratic control and fairness take centre
stage. This is necessary if we are to move beyond
the current focus on individual privacy to broader
questions about social value and the common good.
Yet, while the pitting of public beneﬁt vs. private and
ﬁnancial gain may go some way in distinguishing
genuine from strategic and rhetorical uses of notions
like solidarity, altruism and public good, this frame-
work is limiting.
First, because digital health and the digital economy
more generally are increasingly characterized by new
relationships between public and private, for and not-
for-proﬁt, and ﬁnancial and social value. While many
social scientists, including those discussed above, have
acknowledged this entanglement, for and not-for-proﬁt
practices still tend to be identiﬁed as distinct archetypes
in their orientation towards the common good, as indi-
cated above. Yet, increasingly, these orientations are
converging, and ‘doing good’ is becoming an inalien-
able – not an additional – dimension of corporate activ-
ity (McGoey, 2015; Prainsack, 2017a). Rather than
interpret this as a simple co-optation of the rhetoric
of the common good by the corporate world, it may
be more fruitful to understand this convergence as an
expression of the incorporation of multiple conceptual-
izations of the common good.
Second, and in light of this, the dichotomy of public
good vs. private, ﬁnancial gain fails to account for the
presence of other evaluative regimes – in addition to
altruistic and market logics – that may be at work in
GHR. Doing so risks both misunderstanding motives
for participation in this type of research, and overlook-
ing new forms of ethical innovation that may be intro-
duced, including by corporate actors. In other words, if
what we seek to secure is public beneﬁt, social value and
the common good, broadly construed, then we need to
ﬁrst acknowledge that there may be more than one con-
ception of the common good present in GHR.
A framework for mapping the moral landscape
of GHR
In their seminal work On Justiﬁcation (2006 [1991]), the
economic sociologists Boltanski and The´venot argue
that an important yet neglected dimension of social
interaction is the way people justify what they do.
People typically do not invent false pretexts to explain
their actions, they argue, but rather try to act in ways
that can withstand the test of justiﬁcation. The justiﬁ-
cations that people use to explain the worth of their
own acts or to criticize those of others, furthermore,
are not purely subjective, but are based on higher
common principles that are generalizable and can be
recognized by others. The authors refer to these as
moral repertoires or orders of worth: coherent vocabul-
aries of argumentation and justiﬁcation that are each
organized around one vision of the common good.
They suggest that six such repertoires, each based on
diﬀerent philosophical foundations concerning moral
worth, are commonly appealed to in Western liberal
societies: what they call the ‘market’, ‘civic’, ‘domestic’,
‘fame’, ‘inspired’ and ‘industrial’ repertoires. They later
expanded this typology to include two more repertoires,
the ‘project’ and the ‘ecological’ (Boltanski and
Chiapello, 2005 [1999]; Lafaye and The´venot, 1993).
Each repertoire acts as a logical, harmonious order of
statements, objects and people, that provides a general
sense of justice.
Boltanski and The´venot’s typology oﬀers a useful
framework for identifying the moral orientations of dif-
ferent actors in GHR.2 Importantly, it assumes a richer
ethical pluralism than is allowed for in the dichotomous
framing of data sharing in terms of public or private
beneﬁt. It presumes that there are a number of visions
of the common good that typically compete, clash and
might be reconciled in practice. This entails taking
actors’ own justiﬁcations and moral vocabularies ser-
iously. Indeed, Boltanski developed his ‘sociology of
critique’ in response to Bourdieusian ‘critical soci-
ology’, which he saw as being based on trying to
unveil the ‘real’ motivations and desires of people and
explaining them in terms of habitus and structure.
Instead, Boltanski’s sociology of critique requires enga-
ging seriously with the diﬀerent conceptions of the
common good that are being put forward in GHR –
including those of corporate actors – rather than
assuming that certain groups of actors are motivated
by benevolent or malevolent intentions, or authentic or
rhetorical appeals to the common good.
In the following, I use the framework of justiﬁcation
to identify a number of diﬀerent repertoires and visions
of the common good mobilized in GHR. Not just the
civic (doing good for society) and market (enhancing
wealth creation) repertoires, which make up the
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dichotomous framing provided by critical data studies
described above. But also the industrial (increased eﬃ-
ciency) and the project (innovation and experimenta-
tion) repertoires, and what I identify as a repertoire
of vitality (proliferating life). The data used for the ana-
lysis is taken from promotional material of GHR-type
initiatives by companies and research institutes, policy
documents and articles on digital health and the digital
economy, and preliminary interviews with participants
in GHR-type collaborations. Table 1 oﬀers an overview
of the identiﬁed repertoires. My main question in
undertaking the analysis is, which orders of worth are
appealed to by diﬀerent actors, including academics,
corporate actors, patients and governmental and
public health oﬃcials, in order to justify or encourage
collaboration in GHR-type initiatives?
The civic repertoire
The antagonistic evaluative regimes of public good and
private gain identiﬁed by critical approaches to digital
capitalism and digital health correspond to what
Boltanski and The´venot call the civic and the market
orders of worth. The civic repertoire emphasizes the
collective or general will over and above that of the
individual. Here the common good is conceptualized
as collective well-being. Civic justiﬁcations will fore-
ground values such as equality, participation, solidarity
and inclusivity, expressed in things like rights, laws and
procedures, and include subjects conﬁgured as citizens,
partners and collectives. The civic repertoire is perhaps
most commonly associated with general appeals to the
‘common good’ and ‘public good’, as that which bene-
ﬁts society as a whole.
In the health context, medical professionals and
public representatives will typically appeal to this
repertoire to justify the eﬀorts and sacriﬁces demanded
of all citizens in the aim of advancing scientiﬁc research
and improving healthcare. Thus, the NIH’s Precision
Medicine Initiative is aptly called ‘All of Us’, and is
depicted as an ‘active partnering’, with universities,
patient organizations and private companies – including
Google Verily3 – to ‘accelerate health research and med-
ical breakthroughs. . . for all of us’ (NIH, n.d.). In civic
justiﬁcations, patients will typically be framed as ‘part-
ners in research’, as is the case for example in both the
‘All of Us’ programme and commonly in Apple
ResearchKit studies. Civic justiﬁcations will ﬁnd their
way into technology design as well. Discussing some
design features of ResearchKit apps, John Wilbanks
of Sage Bionetworks, the organization that helped
develop some of the ﬁrst ResearchKit studies, has iden-
tiﬁed altruism as an important motivator for participa-
tion (Comstock, 2016). The apps, he explains, are
designed in such a way that clariﬁcations about how
participation helps others is made explicit at each step
of the process. Similarly, new attempts to create citizen-
run health data commons, in the form of self-governing
communities and cooperatives, draw predominantly on
the civic order of worth, whereby collective decision-
making, reciprocity and shared beneﬁt are fore-
grounded, and the social value of health data is prior-
itized over its economic value (see for example https://
www.personalgenomes.org/#; https://
www.openhumans.org).
Civic justiﬁcations are, as critical theorists rightly
point out, commonly appealed to by corporate actors
as well. On its website, 23andMe frames participation
in their research as ‘becoming part of something bigger’
(23andMe, n.d.), and Facebook’s collaboration with
the University of Michigan is called ‘Genes for Good’
(University of Michigan, 2018). Such examples abound,
Table 1. Moral repertoires present in GHR.
Repertoire Common good Values Example Health(care) as
Civic Collective well-being Inclusivity, solidarity,
equality
‘Becoming part of something
bigger’ (tech firm)
A human right
Market Economic growth Competition, consumer
choice, profit
‘Competition is awesome; it
forces people to up their
game’ (director, health
coalition)
A market good
Industrial Increased efficiency Functionality, expertise,
optimization
‘Transforming health and care
through technology’
(public health provider)
A (data) system to
streamline
Project Innovation and the network Activity, experimentation,
connection
‘Healthcare is ripe for dis-
ruption’ (practitioner)
A project requiring
innovation
Vitality Greater health Good health, life, vitality ‘Help them lead healthier
lives’ (executive, tech firm)
Intrinsically worthy
GHR: Googlization of health research.
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and are reiterated and reﬁned in statements made by
these companies’ leading executives. Mustafa
Suleyman, one of the co-founders of Google
DeepMind, has said about starting the company that
it ‘was our best shot at having a transformative, large
scale impact on society’s most pressing challenges’
(Shead, 2018). Similarly, Apple CEO Tim Cook has
explained that the motivation behind creating Apple
was to be ‘a force of good’ (2017). When discussing
the ResearchKit software, he explains that there is ‘no
business model there. Honestly, we don’t make any
money on that. But it was something that we thought
would be good for society and so we did it’.
The market repertoire
The market order conceptualizes the common good as
economic growth that eventually beneﬁts everyone, as a
by-product of wealth generation. Here the values of
competition and consumer choice are foregrounded.
As indicated above, when executives at tech ﬁrms jus-
tify their entrance into the health domain, the civic rep-
ertoire is typically mobilized. But the market repertoire
will never be far oﬀ. Indeed, while Cook claims that
Apple is not making any ﬁnancial proﬁt on the
ResearchKit, he explicitly speaks of Apple’s interest
in health in general in terms of a ‘business opportunity’,
where ‘medical health activity is the largest. . . compo-
nent of the economy’. He adds, ‘[t]here’s a lot of stuﬀ
that I can’t tell you about that we’re working on, some
of which it’s clear there’s a commercial business there.
And some of it it’s clear there’s not. And some of it it’s
not clear’ (Cook, 2017). Suleyman has similarly
explained that, while the business model for
DeepMind’s involvement in health may not yet be
explicit, it will be in the near future: ‘Right now it is
about building the tools and systems that are useful and
once users are engaged with them we can ﬁgure out how
to monetize them’ (in Wakeﬁeld, 2016). These state-
ments indicate that civic and market justiﬁcations do
not clash for these actors, but can be juxtaposed in
ways that are ‘not clear’, because, ultimately, they
both seek to maximize the common good.
In the health sector, market justiﬁcations that frame
commercial digital innovation as a means of both driv-
ing economic growth and of reducing health care costs
are common. As the director of a coalition of patient
groups and provider organizations has said about
Amazon, Alphabet and Apple’s push into the health
sector, ‘Competition is awesome; it forces people to
up their game’ (Pratt, 2018). Governments make similar
appeals to the market order of worth to justify digital-
ization of health that is mediated through private entre-
preneurship or public–private partnerships. This is one
of the basic ideas, for example, behind Europe’s Digital
Agenda, which envisions ‘quadruple helix’ collabor-
ations that bring together academia, industry, govern-
ment and civil society in new ways as the basis for the
future knowledge economy (European Commission,
2016). Importantly, then, endeavours to unmask the
market logic, which ultimately position it as diametric-
ally opposed to the public or the common good, fail to
comprehend it as an additional moral orientation to the
world (Lehtonen and Liukko, 2010), one that also seeks
to justify actions in terms of the common good, of
which notions like proﬁt and competition, and actors
like entrepreneurs and consumers are part and parcel.
The industrial repertoire
In the industrial order of worth, the common good is
conceptualized as increased eﬃciency. In this order,
typical worthy persons are engineers and experts, and
typical objects will include graphs and charts, tools and
methods. The industrial repertoire is a dominant one in
the context of healthcare today, where digital technol-
ogies promise to propel medicine forward through early
diagnosis, the development of precision treatments and
the rendering eﬃcient of ineﬃcient healthcare systems
(see e.g. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy, 2017). The prevalence of the industrial reper-
toire also has to do with a general discourse that asso-
ciates the public sector with lethargy, bureaucracy and
ineﬃciency, and the private sector with waste elimin-
ation and productivity (Mazzucato, 2015). While this
repertoire often draws on elements of the market rep-
ertoire in this sense, it is the skilful engineer, rather than
market forces, that is prominent in this order, and who
can bring ‘solutions’ to ‘broken’ systems.
In this repertoire, healthcare and health science are
often reduced to a logistics process of data ﬂows
between scientists, practitioners and patients. For
example, the director of a Dutch research centre that
is partnering with Verily says he expects technology
companies to ‘resolve friction’ between practitioners
and patients, just as they have done between end
users and providers in other sectors, such as tourism
and travel (Wouters and Kraniotis, 2018). Similarly,
Jessica Mega, Verily’s Chief Medical Oﬃcer, has said
that medical scientists ‘have been using new technolo-
gies for centuries (. . .) But where we are today is about
thinking about new ways to exchange information’
(2018). When health and science are framed as prob-
lems of the eﬀective management of complex data,
experts in data management inevitably become experts
in health.
Scientists collaborating in GHR projects also often
draw on the industrial repertoire. Here too, justiﬁca-
tions are predicated on the belief that these companies
have the technological expertise required to achieve
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scientiﬁc breakthroughs in an age of large datasets and
personalization. On the website for Apple’s
ResearchKit, one scientist declares, ‘[w]e’ve gone as
far as we can with traditional research. Now we have
technology in our pockets that lets us go further’
(Apple, n.d.). Speaking about the Verily Baseline
Project, one of the involved Stanford researchers has
explained that the study is one of the most extensive
longitudinal cohort studies ever attempted in terms of
the amounts and types of data being collected (Rogers,
2017).4 The ﬁnancial capacities of a company like
Verily play a determining role here, to be sure. But it
is their technical abilities which are winning over the
hearts of some members of the scientiﬁc community.
As Robert Caliﬀ, one of the Duke cardiologists work-
ing on the study has claimed, Verily has ‘obviously got
the computing power to do things on a bigger scale
than other people’ (Kaiser, 2014).
The project repertoire
Boltanski and The´venot did not intend their original
typology to be exhaustive. Some years after publishing
On Justiﬁcation, Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) identi-
ﬁed an emerging order of worth in what they call the
network or project order. In the project order, the
common good is conceptualized as innovation, specif-
ically innovation that expands networks. Values that
are foregrounded here include activity, experimenta-
tion, ﬂexibility, change and connection, and persons
of worth are ‘network makers’ who initiate new pro-
jects and whose talent is the capacity to forge new con-
nections between ideas and people. The discourse of
‘disruptive innovation’ is typically an appeal to the pro-
ject order, and one that is very common in the frame-
work of GHR. Here, this repertoire is mobilized to
justify collaboration not with just any industry partner,
but speciﬁcally companies like Google, Apple and
Amazon, as newcomers who breathe creativity and
novelty into old, hierarchical and monolithic healthcare
structures. Explaining her enthusiasm for Amazon’s
recent interest in geriatric health, for example, one
physician claims, ‘Health care – especially for seniors
– is at its breaking point and is ripe for disruption (. . .)
what Amazon has ﬁgured out is that to provide high-
quality health care for seniors, physicians must be
innovative – and disruptive (. . .) we look forward to
seeing what comes next from Amazon’ (Schayes, 2018).
Mobilizations of the project repertoire will be at
work wherever notions like experimentation, innov-
ation, ‘thinking out of the box’ and ‘shaking things
up’ are promoted as valuable. Thus, the idea of work-
ing together on an exciting new future by approaching
the research and healthcare system in an entirely
innovative way runs through many statements on
digital health and collaborating with tech giants.
Here, governmental and academic partners often
deploy a deterministic discourse that portrays network
projects as imminent and inevitable, a future that will
either be shaped with or without them. In these
instances, a sense of urgency and opportunity are inher-
ent justiﬁcations for partnering with tech companies.
For example, the director of one research centre has
described collaborating with technology ﬁrms as
‘driving a bus’, which you can help drive yourself, or
for which you can wait at the bus stop and purchase a
ticket to get on (personal conversation). Similarly, in a
recent interview for Wired detailing France’s ‘AI strat-
egy’ and its importance in sectors like healthcare, PM
Emmanuel Macron explains, AI is ‘the next disruption
to come. So I want to be part of it. Otherwise I will just
be subjected to this disruption’ (Thompson, 2018).
In some cases, project justiﬁcations can be mobilized
to legitimize a violation of rules and norms, involving a
clash between the project and the civic order. For
example, when the recent ICO ruling concerning the
DeepMind / NHS agreements discussed above declared
that more should have been done to ensure informed
consent and privacy (ICO, 2017), DeepMind appealed
to project justiﬁcations, writing apologetically in a blog
that, in the ‘initial rush to collaborate’, they were too
focused on ‘ﬁnding exciting new ways to improve care’
(Suleyman and King, 2017). In other cases, the project
repertoire can be mobilized against the market order:
‘Health care delivery is a big, ugly problem’, a business
professor explains, ‘it might take companies that are
better at innovation and less committed to protecting
existing market shares and proﬁt structures’ (Finley,
2018). Thus, the project repertoire will emphasize
innovation, sometimes at the cost of civic rules and
market growth, as the best way to achieve the
common good.
The repertoire of vitality: A new order of worth
In the justiﬁcation analysis I conducted, a recurrent
repertoire that was not identiﬁed in Boltanski and
The´venot’s works emerged in the form of what I call
a healthist or vitalist order of worth. The repertoire of
vitality conceptualizes the common good as greater
health; of individuals, of the social body and of human-
ity. Here, good health, life and vitality are upheld as the
highest values, (human) life and its proliferation is
understood as having intrinsic value, the pursuit of
the good life is framed in terms of the quest for
health, and society is organized around the manage-
ment of its biological life (Foucault, 1990). Each of
Boltanski and The´venot’s orders of worth are rooted
in speciﬁc politico-philosophical canons of the society
where they are available. In the same way, the
Sharon 7
repertoire of vitality can be linked to a long tradition
linking health and vitality to virtue (e.g. Hippocratics),
to an ethics beyond morality (e.g. Nietzsche), and, more
recently, to individual worth (Crawford, 1980).5
The vitalist repertoire is mobilized by all actors
involved in GHR-type initiatives: patients, medical pro-
fessionals, industry and government oﬃcials. For
example, it is the repertoire of vitality that the director
of research at Moorﬁelds, a hospital partnering with
DeepMind on a glaucoma detection project, appeals
to when he claims, ‘what we learn from this research
will beneﬁt people around the world’ (Ram, 2018). And
Apple COO Jeﬀ Williams, while drawing on elements
of the market repertoire by addressing ‘customers’ and
‘consumers’, mobilizes the vitality repertoire as Apple’s
ultimate justiﬁcation for launching its personal health
records feature: ‘Our goal is to help consumers live a
better day. . . we hope to help consumers better under-
stand their health and help them lead healthier lives’
(Comstock, 2018). Similarly, Verily and DeepMind at
various times mobilize the industrial repertoire in the
name of a vitalist order of worth. On Verily’s website,
one can read that the company’s mission is to ‘make the
world’s health data useful’ (industry), ‘so that people
enjoy healthier lives’ (vitality). The vitalist repertoire
will foreground health and vitality as values in and of
themselves. That is, not in terms of a human right, that
all individuals should have access to (civic repertoire),
nor in economic terms as a good that can reduce the
burden of public expenditure (market), nor in terms of
eﬃciency and expertise, as a system that should be
streamlined (industry), but as values that are intrinsic-
ally worthy.
Towards a research programme on GHR
and the common good
The presence of vitalist justiﬁcations may be unsurpris-
ing in the context of a health-related phenomenon like
GHR, but it illustrates that diﬀerent evaluative regimes
are at work in GHR, and the analytical clarity that
applying Boltanski and The´venot’s interpretive frame-
work provides. The added value of this analytical clar-
ity is three-fold.
A richer ethical terrain
First, it depicts a much richer ethical terrain than is
accounted for in most critical analyses of digital capit-
alism, where (moral) civic justiﬁcations tend to be
pitted against (a-moral) market motivations. Instead,
it foregrounds a panoply of moral orientations of
actors involved in GHR. It is paramount that these
moral orientations be taken seriously, insofar as they
inﬂuence the decision-making, actions, and technology
development undertaken by these actors. Indeed, in the
current situation, where no comprehensive ethical and
policy guidance for GHR exists, these orientations may
be the main driver of practical solutions that are taking
place on the work ﬂoor.
The framework of justiﬁcation was developed as a
research tool to make a pragmatic study of empirical
conﬂicts possible, such as when a conception of the
common good based on one principle of justiﬁcation
is criticized according to criteria based on another. This
is useful for gaining more insight into what is at stake in
conﬂicts that are and will emerge in the context of
GHR. Justiﬁcation analysis can thus help unpack con-
ﬂicts by identifying the multiple values that are at stake
in them that cannot always be reduced to solely civic vs.
market orders of worth. For example, when 23andMe
announced in 2012 that it ﬁled a number of patent
applications, it came under harsh criticism on the part
of customers and academics. The situation seemed to
present a clear clash between the company’s civic rhet-
oric and its proﬁt-oriented practice. Yet, as some com-
mentators have argued, user comments posted to the
company’s blog at the time indicate that it was less the
proﬁt-seeking motives of 23andMe and more the lack
of transparency surrounding these intentions that was
the source of outrage of users (Sterckx et al., 2013). In
other words, what Boltanski and The´venot call the
domestic order (not analyzed in this article), which
mobilize the registers of loyalty, family and trust,
seems to have been just as signiﬁcant in this conﬂict
as the civic order. The typology oﬀered by Boltanski
and The´venot can thus help understand and analyse
experiences of research participation in more nuance
and more granularity. This is necessary in order to ade-
quately address what, exactly, is problematic in such
cases, for example the need for more transparency
and honesty or the need for more legal speciﬁcations
in user Terms of Service.
Critical evaluation of repertoires
In a second instance, providing a richer description of
the ethical pluralism at work in GHR is important
because from here we can begin to critically evaluate
the use of diﬀerent orders and appeals to the common
good. Boltanski and The´venot’s project in On
Justiﬁcation is a descriptive, not a prescriptive one.
They do not provide one overarching norm by which
to adjudicate between repertoires. However, several
steps can be taken to critically assess the use of reper-
toires without eﬀacing their heterogeneity.
First, orders of worth are coherent, harmonious
wholes, that come with their own internal criteria of
worthiness. In this sense, justiﬁcations can be subjected
to their own criteria: one can ask if appeals to
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repertoires live up to their promises of achieving the
common good, or if there are inconsistencies between
rhetoric and practice within the use of speciﬁc reper-
toires. For example, if the market repertoire promises
to achieve the common good by enhancing market com-
petition and consumer choice, we can ask how this sits
with increased monopolization of the internet economy
by consumer tech corporations, and with increased
market share gained by network eﬀects rather than com-
petition. Conversely, if the civic repertoire is beingmobi-
lized to justify the use of the Apple ResearchKit, insofar
as it promises to increase inclusivity in research by reach-
ing out to millions of iPhone users, we can ask how this
sits with the fact that only a speciﬁc socio-economic
demographic – owners of iPhones – can participate in
ResearchKit studies. This raises not only issues of popu-
lation bias, but also undermines diversity and inclusion.
Subjecting the use of repertoires to their own internal
criteria can thus contribute to ‘debunking’ practices and
policies that are justiﬁed as promoting the common
good on their own terms, rather than attempting to
unmask these as proﬁt-driven practices that are not
aimed at promoting the common good.
This is not to say that stakeholders are accountable
to their appeals to repertoires in the same way that they
are accountable to, for example, a policy manifesto.6
But the assumption in the justiﬁcation framework is
that people ﬁnd it important to justify what they do
and that they will continually seek to justify their
actions when confronted with criticism. This is a
potent but still mostly untapped force in discussions
on how to regulate the digital economy. Furthermore,
Boltanski and The´venot’s plea to take actors’ justiﬁca-
tions seriously is also a means of entering into dialogue
with stakeholders in which there can be agreement
about a set of moral principles; an agreement which
we can expect stakeholders to feel some responsibility
towards.
Second, beyond achieving this internalist critique,
such a critical assessment can help render the trade-
oﬀs involved in the enactment of diﬀerent repertoires
more explicit. For example, perhaps Alphabet is indeed
the only actor with the data expertise and ﬁnancial
resources necessary to realize the promise of data-
driven health research today. But the price of uphold-
ing eﬃciency and expertise as a higher good (industrial
repertoire) must be made explicit: that technology com-
panies may decide who gets access to valuable datasets7
– here open science is at stake – and that healthcare
services developed on the basis of these may become
more expensive – here social justice is at stake. This
analysis needs to be undertaken for all repertoires,
not just the market or the industrial, insofar as all rep-
ertoires can be expected to have drawbacks. Thus, a
dominant vitalist repertoire can also have signiﬁcant
adverse eﬀects, beginning with ubiquitous medical
and lifestyle surveillance as the price to pay for better
health outcomes. Moreover, this type of evaluation
needs to be extended to situations where civic justiﬁca-
tions made by civic actors are prominent as well. For
example, participation in citizen-run health data col-
lectives and cooperatives, proposed as a solution to
what is perceived as a new ‘enclosure’ of the health
data commons (see e.g. Symons and Bass, 2017),
require a high level of citizen involvement. But is it
fair to expect this level of engagement on the part of
all citizens? Might it lead to ‘participation fatigue’, and
eventually to a situation where inclusivity becomes a
luxury of the well-informed and well-to-do? And we
can question if this is the best way of ensuring demo-
cratic control and enhanced collective agency in the
context of digital health and capitalism?
Development of normative solutions
The critical evaluation of repertoires and the explica-
tion of the trade-oﬀs that their enactment may entail is
a crucial exercise, that opens up the space to reﬂect and
deliberate about what is at stake in the move towards
GHR, where repertoires could, so to speak, comprom-
ise, balance and check one another. This can lay the
groundwork needed to develop normative guidelines
for governance of GHR, in the form of combinations
of repertoires that will invoke justiﬁcations that appeal
to a wide range of actors.
One important criterion here should be that such
combinations always involve an important civic com-
ponent, insofar as the most salient challenges concern-
ing GHR are, as discussed, societal value and collective
beneﬁt, rather than just privacy. We might imagine, for
example, a guideline based on the idea that the techno-
logical expertise of a consumer technology company is
needed to advance research (industry), but that GHR-
type collaborations require a separation of roles (civic),
whereby corporate actors cannot both provide the tech-
nical infrastructure used in the research project (i.e.
collect and store data) and be in charge of data analysis.
Another combinatory solution could entail that corpor-
ate actors are entitled to a return on investment
(market), but that a tax on data use generated in the
public domain (industry) redistributes wealth for public
needs in the health sector (civic).8 Or, following the
23andMe patent and the DeepMind/NHS controver-
sies, that trust (domestic) is enhanced not solely by
increasing the speciﬁcity of informed consent (civic-pro-
cedural), but by increasing transparency concerning the
potential commercial gains, even if these are not yet
known (civic-reciprocity / domestic-respect). Good com-
binations will thus have strong civic components, as
safeguards for the perversions of other orders of
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worth, but these will be the result of civic justiﬁcations
having engaged with other industrial, market, project
and vitalist justiﬁcations, and their visions of the
common good.
Conclusion
In this article, I argued that GHR is a new model of
multi-stakeholder, data-driven health research that is
emerging at the intersection of digital health and digital
capitalism, and which must be situated in the broader
context of the political economy of data sharing if we
are to grasp the full spectrum of challenges it raises
beyond privacy harms – namely the more politically
salient question of collective beneﬁt and societal wel-
fare. While critical studies of data sharing practices are
helpful in foregrounding this, they tend to frame these
practices in terms of public beneﬁt vs. private, ﬁnancial
gain, a framing that allows for only one conception of
the common good – a civic one. Using the framework
of justiﬁcation analysis, I showed that beyond this
dichotomy, multiple conceptions of the common
good, in the form of competing moral repertoires, are
present in GHR.
This analysis was carried out on a relatively limited
set of data. Subsequent interviews with more actors
involved in ongoing GHR-type initiatives will likely
reveal additional recurrent justiﬁcations and visions
of the common good. Furthermore, a closer look at
how repertoires and combinatory solutions are lim-
ited and enhanced by and embedded in national,
regional and international legislation and policy-
making on AI and Big Data in health needs to be
carried out. The current descriptive work provides a
better understanding of the complexity of the moral
landscape of GHR and digital capitalism broadly
speaking, which is necessary if we are to develop
new governance models for the digital era. Namely, if
the civic order of worth, which emphasizes collective
welfare, solidarity and social value, is jointly upheld as
the most publicly legitimate conception of the common
good, it needs to be strengthened and rendered ‘present-
proof’ in light of the empirical reality of GHR. To do
this it needs to engage seriously with competing concep-
tions of the common good, so that it can position itself
as a safeguard against the perversions and drawbacks of
other conceptions (and be aware of its own), and work
to incorporate components from other conceptions
where valuable.
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Notes
1. In addition to the ‘direct care’ loophole, Powles and
Hodson also argue that DeepMind, though branding
itself a simple ‘data processor’, in practice took on the
more prominent role of joint ‘data controller’ in the part-
nership. DeepMind has disputed the findings of this study
in a letter (King et al., 2018), to which Powles and Hudson
(2018) have also responded.
2. This framework has been successfully used to analyse phe-
nomena as varied as the promotion of private health insur-
ance (Lehtonen and Liukko, 2010), to the globalization
debate and local political disputes (Yla¨-Anttila and
Luhtakallio, 2016).
3. Verily, formerly ‘Google Life Sciences’, is Alphabet’s
research organization devoted to the study of life sciences.
4. In addition to ‘traditional’ clinical, molecular and genomic
data, the study will also collect data on stool, saliva, tears,
sleep patterns, physical activity, social media activity and
psychological variables.
5. The philosophical grounding for this emergent order of
worth calls for a much broader discussion than is possible
in the scope of this article.
6. I thank a reviewer for bringing my attention to this very
important point.
7. According to one researcher working on Verily’s Baseline
Project, Verily plans a ‘lockout period’ when only paying
customers and Verily’s academic partners will be able to
access the collected data (Piller, 2016).
8. Prainsack (2017b) is developing precisely this type of solu-
tion, involving a tax on data use that would not be ‘in the
public interest’. Similarly, Parry and Greenhough (2018)
discuss the value of developing a new system of ‘bioinfor-
mation taxation’ based on their earlier work on compen-
sation mechanisms for the use of resources like animal and
microbial bioinformation.
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